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Policymaking for posterity involves current decisions with distant consequences.  Contrary to conventional
prescriptions, we conclude that the greater wealth of future generations may strengthen the case for
preserving environmental amenities; lower discount rates should be applied to the far future, and special
effort should be made to avoid actions that impose costs on future generations.  --  Posterity brings
great uncertainties.  Even massive losses, such as human extinction, however, do not merit infinite
negative utility.  Given learning, greater uncertainties about damages could increase or decrease the
optimal level of current mitigation activities.  --  Policies for posterity should anticipate effects on:
alternative investments, both public and private; the actions of other nations; and the behaviors of
future generations.  Such effects may surprise.  --  This analysis blends traditional public finance and
behavioral economics with a number of hypothetical choice problems.
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        I.  Introduction
Comparisons of present and future benefits and costs are ubiquitous in the formulation of public 
policy.  How much research should governments support, what lifetimes should they seek for 
their buildings and monuments, what levels of transfers should they make to children and to the 
aged, how should they think about using debt to finance their activities, and how should they 
value the future environmental consequences of actions taken today?  To answer these questions 
requires comparisons of present and future benefits and costs.
A vast literature has sought to provide ethical and economic arguments as to how such 
comparisons can best be made and can at least in principle take account of issues such as 
uncertainty, the difficulties the government has in mobilizing resources, inefficiencies from 
taxation, the alternative private use of resources, and so forth.  A focus is often placed on the 
appropriate discount rate for the government to use in evaluating various kinds of projects.  
Frederick et al. (2002) surveys this literature, and Portney and Weyant (1999) distills a number 
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comments.3
of thoughtful analyses regarding valuation of the future.  Two widely held conclusions are that 
market rates of discount are not the appropriate indicator when considering projects undertaken 
on behalf of the society as a whole and that market rates are well above society’s true discount 
rate.  The implication is that social investments should weight the future far higher than do 
private projects.
An array of critics, notably including philosophers and scientists, point out that the discounting 
approach routinely ignores a host of ethical issues.  For example, future generations have 
legitimate interests, and those interests deserve more weight than the altruistic concerns of those 
presently alive would give them.  A second strand of ethical argument emerges from a rights 
literature.  This argument, at least implicitly, underscores much of the support for strong action 
against global warming, or more generally climate change.  Human beings, most notably those 
currently alive, have taken actions that have despoiled and continue to despoil the environment.  
The future has as much right as we did to inherit a hospitable Earth.  In some sense this is a 
generalization of the admonition one sees when walking into a nature area:  “Leave this natural 
habitat as you found it.”  This argument would suggest that if society’s choice were between 
spending an incremental $1 billion dollars curbing environmental damage or an equivalent 
amount on medical research, even if all future generations would be better off with the latter, the 
resources should go to curbing the damage.
This paper addresses policymaking for posterity. We employ this term to invoke intervals of 
several decades or centuries, not mere years.  For a variety of reasons, starting with the 
observation that over the very long run those alive today will not be alive to bear the very long-4
run consequences of their actions, we believe that very long-run policymaking needs to be 
conceptualized differently than policymaking over shorter periods.
The posterity problem is of considerable practical importance, since many contemporary policy 
choices will have costs and benefits of policy that play out over very long periods of time.  Very 
long horizons are involved in decisions regarding expensive extremely fundamental research, the 
gradual reform of entitlement programs for the elderly, the storage of nuclear wastes, the 
avoidance of nuclear proliferation, and the protection of the planet from asteroids and comets.  
But distant horizons have received the greatest policy attention in relation to climate change.  As 
the celebrated Stern (2007) Report illustrates, much of the argument regarding global climate 
change turns on the consequences a century or more hence from actions taken or not taken today.    
Nordhaus’s (2007) commentary on Stern demonstrates that conclusions regarding long-run 
discount rates have an enormous impact on policy judgments regarding climate change.  He finds 
that Stern’s very strong conclusions regarding the need for major immediate actions to address 
this area are not driven by new views regarding either its consequences or the cost of preventing 
it but by his assumptions regarding discount rates.  This should not be surprising.  At even a 
relatively modest 3 percent discount rate—a dollar of benefits a century from now is worth less 
than 6 cents today and a dollar 2 centuries from now is worth less than .4 cents.  At the discount 
rate of 7 percent mandated for use in certain US government contexts by the OMB, the distant 
future becomes nearly irrelevant, as $100 a century from now is valued less than 10 cents today.5
Our goal is not to reach an ultimate conclusion regarding “the social discount rate.”  Rather it is 
to contribute to better policymaking for the very long run by identifying a range of 
considerations that should enter into society’s judgments about taking actions that will have 
important consequences for our relatively distant descendants.  We use global climate change as 
our motivating example throughout.  Our analysis proceeds in four sections.
Section II examines very long-run policymaking in the context of certainty.  It argues that even if 
there is in general a reasonably compelling case for the use of a significantly positive discount 
rate in evaluating most public policy questions, there are a number of considerations that suggest 
giving significant weight to the distant future in considering issues like global warming.  These 
derive from reflection on a number of aspects of the preferences that people reveal in 
experiments and in their everyday behaviors, including their undifferentiated views of posterity, 
their disproportionate aversion to suffering or causing losses, and the tendency for the value of 
non-pecuniary goods to rise disproportionately with increases in income.  Our findings in this 
section generally suggest taking more action on behalf of the future than would the standard 
spare discounting approach. 
Section III takes up issues relating when uncertainty is a central concern, as it surely is with most 
issues that stretch across long periods, and for sure with climate change.  Many commentators –
notably Weitzman (2007) and advocates of the so called precautionary principle – view the 
tremendous uncertainty regarding global climate change as an important argument for 
accelerating action, or what leads to the same actions, using a very low discount rate in 
measuring the benefits of climate change mitigation policies.  We conclude, after careful 6
consideration of how to model preferences when catastrophes threaten, and from recognizing 
that uncertainty introduces the possibility of future learning, that the pure uncertainty case for 
giving greater weight to future risks is less compelling than many have suggested.
Section IV takes up what we label “reaction function issues.”  Any choice that society makes 
today has consequences for other choices that private actors and subsequent societies can and 
will make in the future.  That effect is a crucial consideration in policymaking for the very long 
run.  While such reaction function issues are always present in policymaking, we identify a 
number of reasons why they bear in particular on how projects with very long consequences 
should be evaluated.  Other reaction-related issues addressed include generational turnover in the 
identity and possible preferences of policymakers, the global aspect of very long-run issues, and 
questions of how priorities are balanced across areas. 
Section V provides a summary, and suggests some directions for future work.
II. Policy for Posterity Given Certainty
Economists’ standard approach to comparing future costs and benefits is reflected in what might 
be labeled the fundamental discounting equation:
 =  + g*, 7
where   is the discount rate to be applied in valuing future per-capita consumption dollars, δ is 
taken as a measure of pure time preference, g is the rate of growth of per capita income, and η is 
minus the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption.  In essence the equation says 
that a dollar in the future is worth less than a dollar for two reasons: First, the future increments 
to consumption are discounted because of pure impatience.  The δ term would also reflect the 
fact that we give less weight to those alive in the future than we give to ourselves.  The second 
term shows that increments to future consumption are reduced in value because the future will be 
richer, implying that an increment to consumption will be worth less in terms of marginal utility.
There has been much discussion of the appropriate assumptions to make regarding each of these 
parameters, and of consequences of uncertainty regarding them.  The discussions quickly 
become philosophical.  For example—is δ to be thought of as reflecting the value that those alive 
today place on the welfare of future generations or to represent the values that an imagined 
impartial ethical observer, with no particular generational connection, places on different 
generations?  Weitzman (2007) suggests as an easy-to- remember triad of values δ=.02, g=.02 
and η =2 which together imply a discount rate of 6 percent a year, a sufficiently high value to 
render anything that happens a century from now almost irrelevant as a dollar then is worth less 
than $.03 today (.03 > .0029472262 = 1/(1.06)
100). (See also Cowen (2008)). Others, such as 
Stern (2007), argue for alternative and much lower parameter values.
We do not believe that an argument about these alternative parameter values will resolve our 
policymaking concerns.  Hence, we focus on several issues that we regard as important in 
making very long-run policy judgments that do not fit naturally into the standard approach.  8
Global Population Issues.  The fundamental discounting equation simply ignores questions 
relating to the size of the population.  We are inclined to believe that the weight attached to the 
utility of a given generation should be related to its size, and probably proportional.  In this case 
it is necessary to subtract the rate of population growth in discounting future levels of 
consumption.  At the global level or for the United States such a correction would not be 
inconsequential, as population may well grow at close to 1 percent a year for the next half 
century.
Population issues raise further critical questions.  When making policy for the very long run, 
how should a country think about those now living abroad who will immigrate and become 
citizens in the future?  How about those whose descendants will become citizens?  How about 
those nationals whose descendants will marry and have children with noncitizens?    
In an increasingly open world it seems reasonable to suppose that the longer the horizon the 
more cosmopolitan the perspective needs to be, and therefore the size of the population one 
should care about should increase.  To see this point think about a Boston city councilor who 
cares only about the welfare of Bostonians.  She would give little weight to some benefit Boston 
might provide non-Boston residents of Massachusetts next year.  On the other hand if 
considering benefits that would only be realized a half century from now, the distinction between 
Boston and the state seems much less consequential, making the case for a broader perspective 
and other things equal a lower discount rate.  9
When this argument is extrapolated to the world at large, the issue is not merely that people will 
move around and intermarry.  Some populations will grow much faster than others.  How will 
Europeans or Japanese, or indeed most currently prosperous ethnic groups, weight the future if 
they conclude (as at least present evidence would suggest) that their percentage of the far-future 
world population is likely to be much smaller than it is today?  We provide no ethical answer, 
but we would observe that this factor would lead them to weight the future lower.  
Consequences of Income Growth.  The argument is sometimes made that the future will be far 
richer than are we, and that therefore providing for them by providing a less tarnished planet 
makes little sense; it is redistribution in the wrong direction.  In essence, this is giving attention 
to the second term in the discounting equation above.
Of course the argument is not that nothing should be done to provide for the future.  If this were 
done it is unlikely that growth would be positive.  Rather the argument is that the distant future is 
so great a beneficiary of the spillover from investments made for the near term future that no 
special efforts on its behalf are appropriate.  When the Greatest Generation made enormous 
sacrifices to fight World War II, they were preserving liberties in the 21
st century.  But they had 
sufficient motivation to preserve liberty in the 1940s and 1950s.  When Thomas Edison pursued 
his extraordinary array of inventions, he effectively moved all successive worlds years ahead in 
their technological development.  Thus, the Internet might have been delayed for a decade were 
it not for him.  But Edison was substantially pursuing his personal interests, and we are just a 
lucky beneficiary.  And so it is with all commercial R&D work today.  The future benefits 
because much of the information generated is not appropriable.10
The standard discounting approach provides the right way to think about the trade offs involved 
in helping the distant future if what is being traded off is current consumption that is perfectly 
substitutable with consumption in the distant future.  In fact, in most policy contexts the benefits 
to the future are provided in kind, for example in the form of a protected rather than a despoiled 
environment.  
In the environmental case, the benefit to the future of costly actions that we take today needs to 
be measured in terms of the future’s willingness to pay for the amenity, a factor that is usually 
overlooked.  And this will rise with their income, thereby counterbalancing the diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption as a valuation of consumption.  In general, the effect of income 
growth on the value of providing a future amenity will be ambiguous.  Consider the particular 
special case where amenity value is separable, so that a generation’s utility can be written as 
U(c) + a, where c is consumption and a is the amenity.  Then policymakers can consider amenity 
values by using current willingness-to-pay measures and then discounting only at the pure rate of 
time preference whether coming from impatience or generational selfishness.
2  
How important is this amenity elasticity issue?  Potentially quite important.  We would claim on 
the basis of casual empiricism that not only are societies prepared to pay more for environmental 
amenities or good health, for example, as they get richer but they are also more willing to 
sacrifice growth itself.  More generally issues of health and the environment certainly loom 
much larger in rich than in poor countries.  
                                                
2 If the income elasticity of demand for the amenity exceeds the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to consumption, this approach would be an underestimate of how to value an amenity to a future 
generation, and vice versa.  This formulation is simplifying and assuming a generation lives but one period.    11
As we roll into the future, if the past provides any prologue, production goods will be far 
cheaper.  Looking at what might be called terms of trade, amenity goods will be far more 
valuable, and doubly so if – as we might expect -- the income elasticity of demand for such 
goods is high. We could see people in the far future paying many dozens of times as much as 
people would today in terms of dishwashers or televisions sacrificed for an authentic wilderness 
experience, or a magnificent 70 degree spring day in New York.            
Characterizing Altruism.  When considering time preference in the context of altruistic 
preferences, it is hardly obvious that the standard discounting approach applies.  Following 
philosophers, we will consider a hypothetical ethics problem to help get our thinking straight.  
There are two giant comets that will be coming near to the Earth in the next decade, and will 
return again in the far future.  Astronomers calculate that comet A has one chance in 100 of 
hitting the Earth on its next swing by, which will come in 100 years.  Comet B has one chance in 
10 of hitting the Earth on its next swing by, which will come in 400 years.  If either comet is on 
course, there will be nothing that can be done at its next coming.  Either comet will wipe out all 
sentient life if it hits. In preparation for killer comets, the government has prepared a single 
missile-weapon combination that can knock a comet significantly off course.  Should it be fired 
at comet A or comet B? 
Which comet would you target?  Our intuition, and we suspect that of most of our readers, is that 
we would target Comet B.  Yet a policymaker applying any realistic discount rate in the standard 12
framework would choose Comet A using any discount rate even close to or above 1 percent.
3  
But we would argue that it is not clear that we care about people 300 years from now more than 
modestly less than those alive 100 years from now.  True, destroying A would protect an 
additional increment of people, namely those living from 100 to 300 years from now, but that 
hardly would take care of a 10 to 1 disparity in risk.  We regard this as at least a tough 
conundrum.  Moreover, unlike many discounting problems, it would not matter much to us how 
rich these various groups would be.  Talk of great future affluence is a dodge often used when 
not providing for the future.
          
The comet problem convinces us that when we think about people in the far future, we should try 
to think hard about something like a weighting factor on their welfare.  Traditional discounting 
analysis does not help much.  And that weighting factor, at least for many of us, will be far 
greater than any discounting analysis would provide.  Survey results from Cropper, Aydede and 
Portney (1994) indicate that individuals do attach weights to the welfares of far future 
generations well above what a discounting approach with any plausible interest rate could 
accommodate.  
However, such generous weighting leads to a new conundrum when we recognize that the future 
potentially involves an infinite number of generations.  If beyond some point weights to future 
generations are not going to decline, then a loss that continues forever, whenever it starts and 
however small, will count infinitely against benefits today.  As noted above, we are willing to 
give far higher weights to far future generations than would a typical discounting analysis, but 
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we think it essential to have in place some system where a finite loss to each generation over an 
infinite future counts far less than infinity.
4  
Such an approach might involve discounting, or thinking about a representative future 
generation.  Enthusiasm for giving nontrivial weighting to a specific far future generation, it 
seems, may represent some variant of the embeddedness phenomenon well known in the 
contingent valuation literature:  “Different but similar samples of respondents are asked about 
their willingness to pay for prevention of environmental damage scenarios that are identical 
except for their scale: different numbers of seabirds saved, different numbers of forest tracts 
preserved from logging, etc. It is reported that average willingness to pay is often substantial for 
the smallest scenario presented but is then substantially independent of the size of the damage 
averted, rising slightly if at all for large changes in size” (Arrow et al. 1993, p. 26).  In our 
context, asking about valuing a cost to a single generation at a far future date may lead to a 
valuation not much less than asking about that same cost to all generations starting from that far 
future date.   
Reference Points, Loss Aversion, and Errors of Commission.  Many observers will argue that 
climate change is special, that we have more of an obligation to avoid destroying something that 
has been bequeathed to us by nature than to provide the future with say enhanced intellectual 
capital (from R&D, say).  There are three strong elements to this argument: reference points, loss 
aversion, and errors of commission.  Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) tells us that 
utility does not attach to the state space, rather to changes from the state space.  It tells us as well 
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we have no control, for example a devastating war, can lead to effective declining weights as generations roll 
forward, but we are using this device to rescue the analysis.  14
that individuals treat losses from some reference point as being much more consequential than 
gains.      
Every time a climate-change agreement is formulated, there is a profound debate on where 
should we start, what the reference point should be.  Should it be current emissions, 2006 
emissions (the baseline for the July 2008 Harvard University plan to curtail greenhouse gases by 
30% by 2016), or some other date.  When the G-8 countries agreed to a 50% cut by 2050, Japan 
wanted to start from 2008 levels; the Europeans favored 1990.  The agreement specifies no date.  
Most discussions set a reference point for greenhouse gases, but if significant economic 
sacrifices are at stake, there are likely to be reference points for those losses as well.  Prime 
ministers and presidents can’t hope to sacrifice GNP for climate control without hearing strong 
cries of protest from those experiencing loss aversion on their incomes.  In growth economies, 
matters will be easier, because the cuts will come against what would have been their incomes, a 
moving and hence more fuzzy reference point.  The “Save More Tomorrow” plan of Thaler and 
Benartzi (2001) increases employee savings by having them commit funds out of their future 
salary increases, presumably something that is less noticed, that serves less as a reference point.  
Our strong suspicion is that expenditures for climate change will be far easier to make in 
economies where per capita income is growing.    
Environmental problems often involve an additional element:  One’s purposeful action 
determines the change.  That is where the contrast between errors of omission and commission 
play such a strong role.  Consider the everyday problem of litter in a park.  We all would prefer 15
to encounter three rather than a dozen pieces of litter.  The omission-commission distinction 
pushes further.  Most citizens would never consider picking up some of those dozen littered 
pieces.  But they would also never litter, whatever the current level.  Thus, if a citizen 
inadvertently dropped a piece of paper she would pick it up, to avoid an act of commission.   We 
thus observe a hierarchy of utility states:  Littered partly due to me, littered more than usual, 
littered the usual amount, clean.  For most citizens, the benefit of exiting the lowest state makes 
it worthwhile to bend over, pick up, and find a trash can.  But they would not make that effort to 
transit upward from other states.  The same underlying motivation, we believe, motivates many 
citizens’ thoughts about climate change:  Their normal altruism for the future is reinforced by 
their guilt in contributing to the problem of greenhouse gases. 
Consider another example, where concern about an act of commission plays a major role.  It is a 
variant of the famous trolley problem proposed by Foot (1967):
A trolley is running out of control down a track, on course to kill five people. You can push a fat 
man in front of the trolley. He will be killed, but the trolley will be stopped and the five will be 
saved. Would you push the man?  
Few people would push the man to his death.
5  (Informal surveys suggest that economists are 
more willing to do so.)  Commission makes a big difference, but it is not a trump card.  If the 
numbers were 20 and 1, there would be more pushers.  The same factors would influence 
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policymaking for posterity.  Actions that avoid imposing harm will get extra weight, but the 
magnitudes of costs and benefits will surely matter as well.
The implication of these examples is that in doing policy analysis for the very long run we 
should give greater weight to damage done to those alive in the distant future as a consequence 
of our actions than to damage caused by external events.  While the issue of what is the 
appropriate reference point arises—is it not emitting any greenhouse gases? not increasing 
emissions? business as usual?—the implication would seem to be that a higher weight should be 
attached to damages caused by our emissions than to changes in consumption arising from other 
causes.  Moreover, there would seem to be no obvious reason why this “caused damage” penalty 
should be felt less strongly as the length of time involved increases.  
Summary.  The considerations adduced here all make a case for giving more weight to the 
distant future, taking more actions on its behalf, than would be implied by choosing “reasonable” 
parameters for the fundamental discounting equation.  They also point in the direction of 
applying lower discount rates at longer horizons—a conclusion urged by others, notably 
Weitzman (1999) and Gollier (2008), on grounds related to uncertainty.
6  We leave to future 
research the question of how the appropriate magnitudes can best be gauged.
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10,000 year analysis of Yucca Mountain nuclear waste storage, which was recently exceeded by the newly 
announced 1 million year time horizon.  (See the introduction to this issue.)17
III. Policy for Posterity Given Uncertainty 
Analysts who see the need for dramatic action to address the threat of climate change frequently 
invoke the tremendous uncertainty about the impact of climate change as an argument for more 
sweeping measures.  They are dissatisfied with the conclusions that come out of standard 
economic models that employ discount rates of several percent.  Weitzman (2008a) and (2008b) 
has attracted the most attention in this regard.  In the previous section we identified a number of 
routes to serious action that did not involve uncertainty.  Here we suggest that the effects of 
uncertainty are less clear cut than is often supposed.  We take up two issues: the proper modeling 
of low probability catastrophic events and the impact of uncertainty and learning on the timing of 
mitigation policies.  We then offer a brief observation on the implications of our analysis for 
geoengineering policy.
Valuing Low-Probability Catastrophic Losses Due to Climate Change.  To simplify and aid 
intuition, let us leave the intergenerational context, and merely ask how the present generation 
should behave if it alone were empowered to save or potentially save the far future.  That is, in 
the language of torts, we are the last clear cost avoider.  Only if we “swerve” will the “accident” 
– in this case a climate catastrophe – be avoided.  The simple situation is that we can invest today 
to reduce the risk of catastrophe to a generation living say 100 years into the future, and its 
successors.  The first question, of course, is how large is the risk, and how much can we reduce it 
at what cost?    18
The second question is how we should value such a reduction.  We address the second question, 
leaving the first primarily to the scientists.  To address it, we must decide at the outset whether to 
rely on how most people appear to think, i.e., the behavioral approach, as opposed to what 
rational decision theory would prescribe.  The answers can be far different.
The behavioral approach, as typified by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), would 
tend not to make a strong case for acting to reduce the risk of low probability catastrophes. This 
is because empirical evidence suggests that as long as there remains some risk of catastrophe 
people do not value very highly reductions in its magnitude from say 10% to say 1% very highly 
and certainly not as much as standard decision analysis would suggest they should.  As 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) points out, people overestimate the probability of low frequency lethal 
events, and underestimate the probability of more common fatal occurrences. 
Climate change is a sufficiently serious problem, the dollars to be expended on it are sufficiently 
great, that we believe society should follow rational decision theory rather than common –
indeed almost universal – behavioral propensities.  We leave to our elected leaders how to work 
out the politics for pursuing the rational approach.
The rational approach merely requires two simple functions, one that gives the probabilities of 
various outcomes in response to our actions, and a second that values those outcomes.  There is a 
great range of outcomes, to be sure.  Within the category of catastrophe, there are those that 
merely represent grave loss of value, say equivalent to a reduction in GNP by 75%, and those 
that are truly cataclysmic, such that human life is no longer possible.  To illustrate our approach, 19
we will assume that there can be just two outcomes, normal and cataclysm.  In effect, all 
catastrophes are upgraded to cataclysms.  This conservative formulation is merited given that we 
shall conclude that even though our generation is the last clear cost avoider, and even though a 
cataclysm has a finite probability, we should not sacrifice unlimitedly, or indeed excessively, to 
avoid the cataclysm.
Our approach is inspired by the recent papers of Weitzman (2008a, 2008b).  He makes a 
convincing case that we cannot rule out a cataclysmic future outcome from climate change, in his 
terminology, that the “probability density function of climate catastrophes has an extreme tail 
that is heavy with probability” (2008b, p. 2).  Following on this analysis, Weitzman foresees 
“potentially unlimited downside exposure.”  This leads him to reject the traditional cost-benefit 
approach, within which discounting plays a major role.
Our formulation in the previous section allows for a departure from standard discounting models.  
Indeed, we are willing to attach reasonable values to costs going to far-future generations.  
Nevertheless, we draw a different conclusion than Weitzman.  That is because whereas his 
valuation functions allow for unlimited downside exposure, i.e., utility going to negative infinity, 
ours do not.  
Climate-change cataclysms in decisions made by society, we believe, should be treated on the 
same basis as personal cataclysms in personal decisions.  Consider a bachelor with no 
dependents.  He has a 1% chance of dying in the next week.  That is as bad an outcome as he can 
imagine.  This risk can be eliminated completely, for a price.  What is the maximum amount he 20
should pay?  This question should be addressed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function with two arguments:  wealth, w, and a dummy variable representing life (1) or death (0).  
Basically, they solve the equation:
                          0.99U(w, 1) + 0.01U(w,0) = U((1-x)w,1),
where x indicates the maximum fraction of wealth – which incorporates human capital –they 
would sacrifice.   Most reasonable individuals, we believe, would give up much more than 1% of 
their wealth.  But we also believe that most would give up much less than 90% of their wealth.  
Basically, we are arguing that life at full wealth is given a utility value of 1, and death with full 
wealth is assigned a utility value of 0, that life with 10% wealth registers less than 0.99.  That 
hardly seems unreasonable.  
By way of contrast if we had assumed that death had infinite negative utility or alternatively that 
there were an unlimited range of terrible outcomes whose probability declined less rapidly than 
their disutility increased, we would have found that the individual was willing to make unlimited 
sacrifices to reduce the risk of cataclysm.  Essentially this is what all of Weitzman’s examples 
do.  If one for example assumes that there is no outcome possible in which the utility losses are 
greater than those associated with a 99% drop in consumption, his strong conclusions no longer 
follow.  
The argument could be made that even for an individual judging for himself, the extinction of 
human life is considerably worse than his own death, particularly if the extinction of life includes 21
his death as well.  To simplify thinking, leave aside the time dimension, and consider a world 
under a 1% threat of a current cataclysm that would kill all then alive and thus human life 
forever.  Given current living standards in developed nations, what percent of its income would it 
give up to remove this threat?  We doubt the median answer would be above 50%, and certainly 
not above 90%.  This answer, whatever it is, is an upper bound on what should be paid to avoid 
such a threat in the future.  We recognize, of course, that most of those who push for strong 
action against climate change would take exception to this hypothetical on one or both of two 
grounds:  (1) The risk of cataclysmic outcomes given our current course with greenhouse 
emissions is way above 1%, perhaps above 90%.
7  (2)  The costs of dealing adequately with 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions should only be a small percent of income.        
It is possible that there is a case based on low probability cataclysms for precipitous policy 
action, for far more than standard analyses suggest is appropriate.  But this case we believe has 
to be made in a context that avoids approaches to infinite disutility.
Uncertainty and Learning and the Timing of Climate-Change Mitigation.  All parties to the 
climate-change debate agree that it is afflicted with massive uncertainties.  Interestingly, the two 
sides – those favoring greater and those favoring lesser immediate action – claim that the 
presence of dramatic uncertainties bolsters their argument.  The former make the familiar point 
that the worse things could be, the more current action is necessary.  The latter observe that with 
larger uncertainties, the benefit of waiting and learning what level of action is required is 
                                                
7 This begs the question of how to define a cataclysm.  Few observers think global warming has much potential to 
wipe out human life forever, for example.22
enhanced.
8  As in many a folk tale, both sides are right.  The dispassionate economist would put 
it differently.  Given two competing considerations, it is usually the case that for some parameter 
values one effect predominates and for others the other.
9  We thus posit:
Hypothesis 1:  If there is uncertainty about damages, and that uncertainty will be resolved in the 
moderate future, then whether greater uncertainty will increase or decrease the fraction of total 
effort exerted in the first period will depend on parameter values. 
To prove this hypothesis, two simple numerical examples would suffice.  The highly simplified 
model below is richer.  It lays out the considerations that dictate when uncertainty should 
accelerate action and when it should delay it.  There are two periods.  They might be thought of 
as 10- or 20-year periods.  Environmental costs are experienced in the second period due to first-
period emissions.  At the end of the second period, there is a tally of all future environmental 
damages due to first- and second-period emissions, what we will call forward damages.  
Damages are uncertain, being either high or low.  No learning about damages takes place during 
a period.  At the end of the first period, the expected damages from emissions are learned, which 
will inform the level of reduction in second-period emissions.
                                                
8 Both sides also claim irreversibilities as a possible source of support. – Gollier et al. (2000) observes that scientific 
progress tends to enhance the efficiency of actions taken in the future, which tends to promote the learn-then-act 
principle, which favors an initially smaller amount of emissions reductions.  Gollier and Treich (2003) address when 
and when not to delay action from a quite different perspective, namely the risk aversion properties of the utility 
function as represented by its second, third and fourth derivatives.  We look at the attractiveness of the learn-then-
act approach in our quantitative model below, though the potential motivation for waiting within it is quite different 
from those just mentioned.  
9 The structure of the model can matter as well, but we do not capitalize on this possibility.23
The control variables are the levels of reduction in first- and second-period emissions, namely r1 
and r2.  Without reductions, emissions will be 100 in either period.  Thus, the r values can be 
thought of as the percentage of emissions reduced in a period.  Reductions entail a cost, c.  The 
cost function for either period is c(r) = r
a, where a>1, implying increasing marginal costs, and 
is a constant.  The uncertainty of concern is the level of damage due to climate change.  The 
damage parameter, d, is either High or Low, indicated by the values H and L, with equal 
probability.  The mean value of the damage parameter is always 1, implying that L= 2-H.  We 
assume that 1 ≤ H≤ 2.  Damages from period 2 forward equal d times the sum of emissions in 
the two periods, namely [d(200- r1- r2)]
q, where q ≥1.
There are also damages in period 2, the result solely of period 1 emissions.  Period 2 damages are 
the fraction b multiplied by emissions to date multiplied by the damage parameter, where 0 ≤ b < 
1.  Thus, period 2 damages are b[d(100-r1)]





q +0.5( [H(200- r1- r2H)]
q + [L(200- r1- r2L)]
q ).
The objective is to select r1 at the outset and r2 after d is learned so as to minimize the expected 
sum of the costs of reduction plus the costs of what damages turn out to be.   For the moment, we 
leave discounting, risk aversion  and period 2 damages aside, and set q=1, to simplify exposition 
and intuition.  Thus, this objective is consistent with either a framework to maximize the 
discounted sum of period expected utilities, or one that merely tallies total costs.       
The specific function we are considering is thus: 24
Minimize       r1
a + 0.5(r2H
a + r2L
a) + 0.5[H(200- r1- r2H) + L(200- r1- r2L)].
The first term represents first-period cost; the second term is expected second-period cost, with a 
different value of r2 selected depending on whether damages turn out to be High or Low.  The 
third term represents the expected forward damages.  The 0.5 values in the objective function 
represent the common likelihoods of the High and Low outcomes. 
Our goal is to determine whether more uncertain damages lead to a larger or smaller fraction of 
total emissions reduction to be undertaken in period 1.  Uncertainty is represented by the spread 
between H and L, which is fully captured by the value of H.  We will investigate this question 
for different values of a, the cost parameter, and H, the damage parameter.  Our concern is the 
effect of increased uncertainty about damages on period 1 action. First, we shall provide intuition 
for what we expect to find.  Second, we shall produce a graph showing how R1 = r1*/(r1* + 
E[r2*])varies as a function of H for various values of a.  The slope of any one of these curves 
gives dR1 /dH.
Note, that as a increases, cost becomes a more important consideration.   To eliminate this factor, 
we can compute a different  for each a to normalize outcomes.  In our numerical calculations, 
we did this.  Each  was selected so that when there is no uncertainty, i.e., when H = 1, the 
optimal values of r are r1*= r2*= 50.  That is, when damages are certain it is optimal to reduce 
emissions by 50% in each period. 25
Absent uncertainty and discounting, given that marginal costs are increasing, reductions should 
be equal in the two periods.  Uncertainty on damages substantially complicates matters.  First, 
relative to the certainty case, you are at least as well off.  You could simply reduce 50 in each 
period and get the same expected outcome you did before.  But you can do better by simply 
altering period 2’s reductions depending on whether H or L applies.  And you can improve on 
that outcome by adjusting period 1 reductions.  How optimal period 1 reductions compare to 
overall optimal reductions is our subject of interest.
For the real world climate-change problem, we might consider ourselves to be in period 1.  The 
question then is whether greater uncertainty on the magnitude of damages, holding expected 
damages fixed, should lead us to greater or lesser immediate action.  The critical argument for 
lesser action is that we can wait, and then decide what to do.  The critical argument for greater 
action is that if damages are uncertain and they turn out to be High, significant reductions will be 
required.  Given the increasing marginal costs of reductions, if we wait till period 2, this will be 
very costly; thus, first-period action should be enhanced.  
To illustrate, we wish to evaluate the difference in r1* between the situation where H = 1 and 
where H = 1.5, assuming that q=1.  Consideration of two extreme cases provides the intuition for 
our result.  Let a = 1.01, so marginal costs only increase very slowly.  Then there is little cost in 
waiting, with a rush of reductions if damage proves High.  Thus, R1 will be below .50 for this 
case.  The optimal values turn out to be r1* =  50, r2H* = 100, and r2L*= .  Thus R1 = 50/(50 + 
.5(100 + )) < .50. Now let a = 4, so that marginal costs increase very rapidly.  Rather than have 
second-period reductions have a 0.5 chance to be quite big, it is better to do a larger share of 26
reductions in the first period.  Thus, R1 will be above .50 for this case.  The optimal values turn 
out to be r1* = 50, r2H* = 57.236 and r2L* = 39.685.  Thus R1 = 50/(50+.5(57.236+ 39.685)) = 
.508>.50).
The case where a = 2 represents a dividing line, since marginal costs increase linearly, and 
raising first-period expenditure by a unit to cut both High and Low expenditures by a unit neither 
saves nor costs money.   Thus, if a = 2, the values of R1 will be constant at 0.5, as r1* =  E[r2] for 
all possible values of , H, and q.
For the case where q > 1, there are increasing marginal costs of damages.  This makes it more 
important to have the ultimate reductions higher when H results.  Once again, we adjust   to 
assure that r1* = 50 when H = 1.  Let q = 2.  Consider as before the comparison between R1 when 
H = 1 and when H = 1.5.  If a = 1.01, R1 goes from 0.50 to 30.397/(30.397 + .5(100 + 0)) = .378. 
However, if a = 4, R1 increases from .50 to .521.  Note that once again, the a value dictates which 
side of .50 that R1 will fall.
The graphs below shows the values of R1 as H increases for various values of a, with q = 1.  As 
is easily seen, dR1/dH is negative when a < 2 and is positive when a > 2. This result holds 
independent of . 27
Figure 1. Period 1 Reductions as a Percent of Total Reductions, q=1. 
The value of a that minimizes R1 for all values of H is about 3.7. The curves that cross are on 
opposite sides of this value, which explains the unusual appearance.
The next graphs are drawn for the case where q = 2, which could be thought of as some form of 
increasing marginal cost of damages.  In comparison to the linear case (q = 1), it becomes more 
important when q = 2 to respond to High damages.  Not surprisingly, r1*is a smaller fraction of 
total expected reductions when a < 2, and a greater fraction when a > 2.  That is because when a 
> 2 it is much more costly to reduce emissions strongly in the second period should damages turn 
out to be high.  In sum, the more rapidly the marginal cost of damages increases, the closer first-
period expenditures are pulled to half of expected total expenditures.   28
Figure 2. Period 1 Reductions as Percent of Total Reductions, q=2.
These graphs provide the examples that prove Hypothesis 1.  That is, and fully in accord with 
intuition, for different parameter values as uncertainty in damages increases, that may lead us to 
undertake a smaller or greater fraction of total expected reductions in emissions in period 1. The
appendix provides Figure 3 as a topographical rendering of Figure 2.
Inserting discounting into our analysis would not fundamentally change the results.  A greater 
discount rate would lower the value of forward damages relative to second-period damages and 
costs, and lower second-period consequences relative to first-period costs.  To illustrate, a 29
constant less than 1 would be multiplied by second-period costs, making the first two terms in 
the objective function be r1
a + 0.5j(r2H
a + r2L
a) for j < 1.  In effect, thus earlier costs and 
damages become more important.  This would drive down r1*, but would not change the 
qualitative properties of dR1/dH.  The effect of period 2 damages is shown in Figure 4 in the 
appendix.
Risk aversion.  Risk aversion presents a more subtle story.
10  Given risk aversion, it matters 
whether utilities are computed period by period, or all at the end.  Following tradition, we shall 
assume the former.  This tradition makes particular sense in this context, since generations can 
hardly shuttle monies back and forth or make contingent trades between themselves.  It is also 
critical to what variables risk aversion applies.  
First consider risk aversion over costs of reduction.  Remember, having a > 1 is not due to risk 
aversion, rather to escalating real costs of reducing emissions in a period.  A tractable and 
plausible formulation for the utility function would have the disutility of costs rising like a power 
function.  Thus, the loss from reductions in period i would be [c(ri)]
e, where e > 1.  This 
transforms the cost function to ri
s, where s = a
e.  For this utility function on costs, all our previous 
results go through if we just substitute s for a. Thus, there will still be a range of a where greater 
uncertainty about damages decreases the fraction of total reductions done in the first period (a
e < 
2), followed by a range where it increases them (a
e > 2).  Note that the cutoff would now be at a 
lower value of a, namely when a
e = 2 for any q.
                                                
10 Normally it is assumed that the government itself should not be risk averse given its ability to diversify, even 
across generations, but given the potential costs associated with climate change (e.g., curbing emissions, damages, 
adaptation, and geoengineering), risk aversion would seem merited.  30
Whatever the risk aversion on costs, let us now switch from risk neutrality to risk aversion on 
damages.  This would mean that the cost of damages increases throughout, but more so for high 
damages.  (One could have thought of q > 1 as representing risk aversion, with expected 
monetary cost of damages held fixed as H varied.)  Risk aversion, in effect, just makes any 
distribution on positive expected damages worse, and the effect is greater the more variability 
there is in damages.  Say that risk aversion was represented by a power function, where losses 
were raised to the power f.  Then, rather than having damages raised to the q power, they would 
be raised to the t = q
f power.   Let us standardize with  so that optimal reductions are 50 when H 
= 1, the central level of damages.  Then the curve representing effective damages will switch 
from being a line through this point (risk neutrality) to being a convex curve through this point.  
These two curves are shown for risk aversion positing that mean damages are 1 and the cost of 
damages is squared.  
Given the convexity of the cost of damages curve, and given that mean damages are 1, whenever 
there is variability in damages it effectively raises their cost.  This implies that risk aversion on 31
damages will lead to more first-period curbing when H > 1.
11  Given risk aversion, greater 
uncertainty on damages will have two effects on first-period curbing.  We explored the first 
effect in Hypothesis 1; it is ambiguous in sign.  The second effect comes because damages have 
become more consequential; it is unambiguously positive.  Hypothesis 1 will still apply, but its 
negative-potential-effect component will apply over a more limited range.          
This analysis highlights a number of factors that bear on the effects of increased uncertainty.  A 
richer multi-period model would permit, we suspect, demonstration of the proposition that the 
speed with which uncertainty is resolved is likely to affect its impact on policy choices.  
Uncertainty that will be resolved quickly is likely to lead to more delay in taking costly steps 
than uncertainty that will only be resolved slowly. 
The examples that we used in this section are obviously highly stylized but we believe they are 
sufficient to call into question the presumption that uncertainty about the impact of global 
warming necessarily calls for bearing more short run costs to provide for long term benefits than 
would be appropriate in its absence.  
Geoengineering.  Most discussions of controlling climate change, including our own, have 
focused on curbing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation).  On a conceptual basis, however, we 
must also be aware that innovative measures could be taken that seek to lower temperatures by 
quite different means, or that seek to reduce damages from climate change.  The three most 
prominent such measures are carbon sequestration, such as capturing carbon dioxide at the power 
plant level and pumping it underground, or planting trees to remove CO2 from the atmosphere; 
                                                
11 If risk aversion is represented by a power function, its presence in effect raises the value of q, parallel to the way 
risk aversion on costs in effect raised the value of a. 32
adaptation, such as building sea walls to cope with sea-level rise or shifting agricultural land use; 
and geoengineering.  It is notable that there has been a major shift towards more positive 
thinking about both sequestration and adaptation in the past fifteen years.  Prominent climate 
scientists now study sequestration possibilities, a once verboten subject.  The 2007 Bali Accord 
gave prominent mention to adaptation and to mitigation possibilities apart from greenhouse gas 
reduction, subjects almost absent from the Kyoto Protocols.  
Geoengineering remains an approach more appealing to economists than other professionals 
addressing climate change.  Perhaps the most discussed geoengineering measure would reduce 
the net amount of incoming solar radiation by shooting aerosols – sulfates being a frequent 
example – or solar reflectors (mirrors) into space.  
Two prime concerns are announced about such measures:  (1) They are unproven.  To some 
critics, this includes the question as to whether they would be too costly even if they worked.  (2) 
They will be upsetting the natural course, and could lead to worse environmental problems.  Two 
other more politically attuned concerns may be less expressed, but surely influence attitudes:   
(3) The more hopes we hold about technological fixes, the less vigorous will be our efforts in 
curbing greenhouse gases, the original cause of climate change.   (4) Failing to undertake 
geoengineering, would it have been successful (something we might never know) would be an 
error of omission.  Undertaking geoengineering when it would prove detrimental would be an 
error of commission.  The latter counts much more.  A final concern is that geoengineering 
measures might prove attractive for individual nations – since cooling benefits are concentrated 
at the local level – even if they were net detrimental to the world as a whole.          33
We express no strong opinions on these matters, but make three observations that follow from 
the analysis in this and the previous section.  (A) Even if geoengineering is a very unattractive 
option it may still affect the policy calculus if it can be called on quickly at some future juncture.  
Imagine that there is a 1 percent chance that global climate change will have costs equivalent to 
90 percent of world consumption, but that there is a geoengineering option that can avoid its 
consequences at a cost of 20 percent of world consumption.  With low probability then 
geoengineering will look attractive in the future even if it does not today.  As with the analysis in 
the first part of this section it serves to bound the cataclysmic possibilities and so affect current 
policy choices.  (B) Considerations of learning become very important if geoengineering is even 
a possibility. If climate change does prove disastrous in any near-term scenario, geoengineering 
will be our only hope.  Wigley (2006) observes:  “More ambitious geoengineering, when 
combined with mitigation, could even lead to the stabilization of global mean temperature at near 
present levels and prevent future sea-level rise to a rate much less than observed over the 20
th
century: aspects of future change that are virtually impossible to achieve through mitigation 
alone.” Curbing greenhouses gases, even severely, cannot alter concentrations significantly in a 
mere matter of years.  If geoengineering is realistic even if highly costly and can be triggered in 
time then policymakers can treat a 20% loss as the worst possibility.  (C) Arguably those most 
worried about global climate change should be most focused on geoengineering at least on an 
experimental basis.  In fact, greenhouse alarmists tend to be strong opponents of geoengineering 
experiments, in part for reason (4) above, but also because they tend to believe that we have little 
understanding of all the ways human actions can seriously disturb the environment.  
  34
IV.  Reaction Function Issues
In any realistic policy analysis it is important to recognize that those whom the policymaker does 
not control are likely to adjust their behavior in response to changes in policy.  Realistic 
policymaking must take this into account.  Thus greater efforts to redistribute income are likely 
to lead to reduced work incentives.  Public efforts to provide for retirement security, health 
coverage or help to the poor are to at least some degree likely to crowd out private efforts.  On 
the other hand, some kinds of policies may have their effects magnified by the responses they 
generate.  Think of demonstration projects or of efforts to make neighborhoods safe so more 
people walk on the street making them still safer.
In context of policymaking for the very long run these issues are especially important for the vast 
majority of what happens in the very long run is surely not under the control of current 
policymakers.  And there is the further point that responses to any policies pursued are likely for 
good or for ill to grow over time.  We consider in turn four aspects of the problem—the effects 
of well intentioned policies towards one social objective on other social objectives, the effects of 
the behavior of the current generation on the behavior of future generations, the effects of the 
behavior of one country where what is sought is the provision of an international public good, 
and the effects of policy on the rate of innovation.
Effects on Alternative Investments. We have adduced in the context primarily of discussing 
global climate change a number of considerations arguing for giving greater weight to distant 35
generations.  While we have so far treated this as an argument for more aggressive climate 
policy, this conclusion may not follow.  Should we conclude that the future should be weighted 
more highly, there is the question of how to help the future.   If we are going to spend $100 
billion to help people living 100 years from now for altruistic reasons, we should find the way to 
spend that money that yields the greatest benefit to them.  Maybe we should be dramatically 
stepping up basic R&D efforts in a variety of areas, focusing on projects that may not yield fruit 
for decades.  Perhaps we should be supporting a flotilla of young artists, some of whom might 
produce great works to be admired as we admire Van Gogh today.   If these efforts would yield 
substantially more benefits to the citizens of 2210 than would enhanced efforts to curb climate 
change, then at least our intended beneficiaries would be better off (however, such efforts are 
directed, we would of course tally benefits along the path to 2210.)
The critical point is that there are many projects that look attractive once we change our way of 
thinking about the future. In principle all such projects should compete against one another, and 
we should start with the ones that are most favorable.  In practice, decisions are typically made 
about particular opportunities.  Thus the standard response of global climate change policy 
advocates to suggestions that alternative policies might yield even greater long-run benefits is to 
say that “maybe and if so we should do them as well.”  Perhaps, but at a certain point the 
capacity to allocate resources to the distant future is stretched and indeed if enough resources 
were so allocated levels of consumption would decline which would operate to raise the discount 
rate applied to future benefits by increasing the expected growth rate.36
Probably the right approach in addressing very long-term investments, analogous to the one 
taken by Feldstein (1964) in thinking about discounting standard public investments, would 
assess the impacts they have on other very long-term investments, and would then apply a 
shadow price to value these impacts.  Thus a global climate initiative that is for reasons 
economic or political likely to crowd out basic scientific research should be judged more harshly 
than an equivalent project that would affect only consumption.
The Intergenerational Game.  In 2008, the G-8 nations agreed to cut emissions in half by 2050.  
Even if we care about the future, and are willing to sacrifice for it, we would prefer to have 
others make that sacrifice for us.  Thus, people around in 1998 but no longer alive, who cared 
about 2050 emissions, should be pleased to be free riders on the altruism of their successors, 
namely us.  The flip side of this argument is that we would hardly be pleased to take costly 
action from 2010 to 2020 only to find that people in 2020 then said they could then slacken their 
effort in response.
If one used a standard reaction function analysis, the more we do today, the less will be done 
tomorrow.  That recognition would dampen enthusiasm for action, and could lead to an 
unfortunate slackers’ equilibrium.  This argument is explored in Arrow (1999) and in the original 
classic paper by Phelps and Pollak (1968).    
But appropriately framed, the direction of influence could go in the opposite direction:  One 
good deed could promote another.  The current generation’s significant effort could set a 
precedent for generosity.  Say its successor framed its choice issue as:  “We have a good policy 37
going.  Do I want to continue, or do I want to break the chain?”  Then, each successive 
generation might find it optimal to continue.  In effect, even though each generation would sell 
the furniture if it thought its successor might do so, none would sell, since each would be 
confident that all successive generations would see matters the same way.
12
Think of a more home-grown example.  You have inherited valuable antique furniture from your 
grandparents.  You are now providing for your own descendants.  One possibility is to sell the 
antiques, and invest the monies.  You conclude that even taking their sentimental values for the 
furniture into account, they would be better off with the money.  Moreover, you do not like 
taking care of valuable furniture.  But you would feel some guilt about selling the furniture that 
has come down through the generations.  If you would feel sufficient guilt, you should keep the 
furniture.  Moreover, if you were willing to sacrifice a certain amount for your descendants, you 
are better off than having sold the furniture.  You would be better off as well if you merely had 
indifference curves between their welfare and your welfare.  You should save some more for 
them in addition.            
This formulation leads to an additional question on intergenerational values.  We have discussed 
altruism toward a specific future generation.  If we have such altruism, so will generations in 
between.  In theory, we should value their altruistic benefits as well.  Thus, when generation 1 
saves for generation 3, it should count the benefit that gives to generation 2.  In theory, this 
process could also go backward in time.  Generation 2, when providing for 3, must consider 
generation 1’s concerns.  Conceivably backward altruism should extend even to generations no 
                                                
12 Stochastic shocks to the system, say a generation might bounce to poor and have to sell the furniture would 
complicate the problem, and would make it much harder to maintain the precedent.38
longer present.  If those generations could not have counted on such altruism, they would have 
been less generous themselves.
13
The picture we have tried to present is of a procession of generations all with concerns for the 
future.  The challenge to them is to make provisions for that future in the most efficient manner, 
given that the generations cannot readily contract with one another.  In these grand tacit 
intergenerational games, framing matters greatly.  Actions will be favored if they can be framed 
in such a way as to call forth increased effort from future generations directed at the very long 
run, rather than offsetting reductions in effort.  
Here Schelling’s (1957) work on focal points is helpful.  Actions framed as noble precedents, 
and established around bright-line markers, are likely to stimulate positive responses.  By 
contrast, complex or overly ambitious schedules for action, which are likely to get short-changed 
a bit even by us, provide both strong temptations for greater chiseling in the future and a negative 
future response to our positive actions now.  
International Considerations.  As noted in Section II, the longer the time horizon the more 
cosmopolitan the appropriate perspective for policymakers in any one nation.  There remain 
however several questions about policymaking for the very long run, particularly in a context 
where decisions are made possibly through international negotiation at the national level.
                                                
13 Their total altruism toward a generation incorporates both its felicities, e.g., benefits from consumption, and its 
altruistic concerns.  The authors consider backward as well as forward altruism (Zeckhauser and Fels 1968).39
First, there is the aspect of voluntary provision of an international public good.  Absent some 
form of binding agreement a country considering taking costly actions to reduce greenhouse 
emissions has to recognize that unless its choices are affecting the choices of other countries they 
are likely to yield only modest benefits to its citizens.  Thus individual countries, even the largest 
emitters, have strong incentives to ride free.  Cheap riding, e.g., making small reductions, may be 
slightly preferred, to provide a warm glow to or diminish the guilt of one’s environmentally 
oriented citizens, or to defuse foreign claims that one is free riding.  Absent an effective 
international agreement, how should a nation think about whether to ride free, ride cheaply, or 
pitch in fully in producing the good?
Second, if one assumes that international negotiation is possible, several issues immediately 
arise.  Can agreements be enforced in a world of sovereign nations?  In the absence of 
enforcement mechanisms will nations adhere to their commitments?  And will inevitable 
concerns about these questions lead agreements to unravel so strongly that even effective 
enforcement mechanisms will be useless?  Assuming away these problems, if different nations 
think about posterity differently how should their preferences be aggregated?  What is the right 
form of an agreement that is expected to influence behavior over a very long time period?  On 
the one hand it is important to be flexible in a highly uncertain world.  On the other, it is 
necessary to make firm commitments in areas where only very long-term investments can 
produce the gains needed.  There is an inevitable tension between establishing enduring focal 
points for action, and responding effectively to new information.   40
Third, how should nations set policy prior to an agreement being reached, or when it is 
anticipated that an existing agreement will be modified? There is the possibility that more 
extensive efforts will encourage reciprocity on the part of others.  But there is also the possibility 
of a ratchet—that whatever progress has been made will be taken as given, so the reference point 
for judging anti-emission efforts will become that much more challenging.  
All of these issues become much more difficult when the putative international agreement 
involves the very long run.  For this means that precedents set may matter greatly for good or ill, 
it means that urgency may be diminished, and it means that enforcement issues become more 
profound when agreements will still be important long after those who negotiate them are no 
longer involved.  Their successors may not feel bound, particularly if their fundamental values 
differ from those who signed the accord, say because their nation underwent a transformation 
from socialism or communism to capitalism.    
Technology. Policymaking for posterity encounters an additional critical reaction function issue 
that arises from the impact of policy commitments on innovation.  Two seemingly contradictory 
bits of folklore, each distilled from experience, come to mind.  On the one hand, it is generally 
believed that cost estimates for major policy changes, like Medicare, or putting a man on the 
moon, or buying a new weapons system, or completing the Big Dig always err massively on the 
low side.  And it is generally supposed that the greater a step into the unknown a policy change 
represents, the greater the underestimate will be.  On the other hand, there is substantial 
experience in the environmental area suggesting that when clear commitments are made, the cost 41
of ultimately meeting them is well below initial estimates.  Examples often cited include the US 
sulfur oxide program, the initial smog controls in Los Angeles, and the ban on CFCs.
Implicitly these two pieces of folklore represent arguments about how projected future costs 
should be discounted.  Proponents of either argument believe that it applies with special force in 
the case of climate change, in part because of the very long time periods involved.  Which of 
these lessons of experience carries more weight for climate change policy?  Most important, do 
current estimates under- or overweight the costs of controlling emissions?  The issue is quite 
important as extrapolation from the former set of examples could easily suggest that 
commitments as large as those involved in achieving huge reductions in carbon emissions could 
easily cost 5 times or 10 times initial estimates, whereas the environmental examples can be read 
as suggesting that initial estimates should be cut by two-thirds or more.
Our suspicion is that judging which consideration is more weighty in any given policy context 
depends on evaluating the source of the estimates.  Estimates for new government programs 
typically are heavily influenced by those most knowledgeable about them, who in turn are likely 
to be enthusiastic and optimistic.  On the other hand, industries facing the prospect of being 
regulated have every incentive to produce high estimates of the costs of meeting any given goal.                                                                  
V.      Conclusion
How vigorous should our current efforts be to combat climate change?  More generally how 
much should we do for posterity?  This essay has clustered the answer under the four Ds:  42
discounting, disaster, distinction, and decision analysis.  All four factors must be considered in 
arriving at an answer.  The mnemonic is appropriate for a 4D world, with time the fourth 
dimension.  
Discounting.  When looking at a problem that stretches across many generations, the economist’s 
standard approach of exponential discounting may be problematic. We raised the possibility 
based purely on preferences – one often asserted by noneconomists – that standard formulas are 
an inappropriate guide for long-distance discounting.  That is, we may, or should, value a 
generation 300 years hence no different than one 100 years hence, if say we are saving it from 
our comet collision.
14  We are agnostic on some such deep discounting questions, but believe 
that if current curbing efforts merit vigorous action, it requires that we have a discounting 
framework that makes the future weighty. 
15  In the realm of discounting, we observed that all 
generations will not be created equal.   If we expect them, as we do, to have more members and 
to be richer, the first clearly calls for a higher weight.   The second almost certainly does for 
what we have labeled amenity goods.
   
Disaster.  Costly efforts to combat climate change are only potentially worthwhile if future 
disaster threatens.  Weitzman (2008) provides a compelling argument why we should expect the 
distribution of costs from climate change to have a fat tail, implying high expected costs at some 
future date.  That finding alone, however, does not tell us how energetic an effort to pursue now.  
In addition, a utility function must be attached to the possible outcomes.  Here we part ways with 
                                                
14 We reiterate the concern that having no diminution in weighting through time, as might come from an 
independent survival risk, implies that a small benefit going to all future generations has infinite value.
15 As we observed in the Introduction, any standard discounting approach using traditional discount rates would give 
far-future generations virtually no weight.43
Weitzman.  Though following normal utility theory analysis, we do not allow for infinitely 
negative outcomes.  Thus, unlike him we will accept a finite probability of a complete disaster 
before sacrificing nearly everything.  Nonetheless, we accept the notion that any consideration of 
climate-change policy must start with an assessment of the magnitudes and likelihoods of 
potential disasters.
Distinction.  There are many ways to provide for the far future.  If one employs a normal 
utilitarian framework, where the relevant arguments are the utilities of the different generations 
(incorporating altruistic components), then our goal should be to find the policy that provides the 
greatest benefit to the far future per unit cost to us.
16  With that formulation, it would seem that 
climate-change policy would have to compete with other measures that help the far future, such 
as medical research.  Say the choice were between devoting an incremental 2% of our GNP on a 
continuing basis to curbing greenhouse gases or to enhancing medical research, perhaps evenly 
divided for the moment between cancer, Alzheimer’s and tropical diseases.
17 Which would 
accomplish more for the far future on an expected value basis?  Say that study revealed that it 
was medical research.  We still might prefer to curb the gases, if due to guilty altruism, or the 
difference between acts of omission and commission, the utility cost to us was less.  Such a 
what-do-the-donors value argument is familiar in the discussion of in-kind transfers, where the 
middle class appears to prefer medical care for the poor as opposed to cash transfers.  Society 
appears to draw strong distinctions between different types of assistance.  Affirmative action 
surely gets an extra push because of our history of slavery, for example.  If we find it cheaper to 
                                                
16 We do not focus attention on any single generation, but think of the far future as a stream of future generations.
17 The NIH 2008 budget was $29.5 billion.  2% of GNP would produce roughly ten times that amount.  Presumably 
an increase in expenditures would take place predominantly in the for-profit sector, say achieved through some tax 
incentive, but still it would take a few years to ratchet up spending significantly without gross waste.  44
in effect avoid littering the atmosphere than making the same expenditures to promote medical 
knowledge, that calculus should inform our climate-change policy.
Decision analysis. Curbing greenhouse gases in an appropriate manner is a long-term dynamic 
optimization process.  The greater are uncertainties, the greater is the risk of waiting.  Even if 
variability does not increase expected damages, it raises the urgency to curb now because 
reduction costs increase at an increasing rate.  But there is a countervailing consideration.  
Increased uncertainty also raises the potential for learning along the way, which could reduce 
optimal current efforts.  Our apparently simple and stylized model showed that when these two 
effects tug in opposite directions, greater uncertainty – assuming that it will be at least partially 
resolved in the intermediate future – may lead to more or less vigorous current efforts.
We believe that these four Ds represent puzzle pieces that must be put together if we are to 
formulate appropriate climate-change policies.  Economists and their fellow travelers have a 
comparative advantage for guidance on discounting and decision analysis.  Scientists have deep 
knowledge on disasters, and can provide an assist on decision analysis.  Philosophers and 
psychologists can supply insights on discounting and distinction.
  
Our principal conclusion is that analyses that focus on merely one or two of the four Ds will be 
no more than a two-dimensional rendering.  Policymaking for posterity must be formulated for a 
four-dimensional world.        
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Appendix
Topographical Renderings of First-Period Reductions 
And the Effect of Second-Period Damages
In both Figures 1 and 2 on the graphs on the right, as a increases, the value of R1 first increases, 
then decreases. Below is another graph for q=2, showing R1 along the vertical axis as a function 
of values for H and a, given that b = 0,  = 3, and q = 2.  This graph, consistent with the right side 
of Figure 2, shows that R1 is maximized for some value of a around 4.  R1 decreases as a shrinks 
to 2 or rises to infinity. The graph is qualitatively similar for q = 1. 
Figure 3.  Topographical Rendering of Figure 2.
We set aside second-period damages thus far; that is set we b=0.  Obviously making b > 0 will 
increase R1 for any value of H.  The next question is how do positive second-period damages 
affect dR1/dH.  This depends upon the parameter values in question.  For example, in Figure 4 (
= 4, a = 1.5, and q = 2), for higher values of H, the value of b matters more; for lower values of 46
H, b matters very little. Thus, given a large amount of uncertainty, the marginal effect of second-
period damages on dR1/dH is greater, albeit decreasing.   
Figure 4. First Period Reductions Given Second Period Damages.47
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